The wormhole hazard by Krasnikov, S.
ar
X
iv
:g
r-q
c/
03
02
10
7v
1 
 2
6 
Fe
b 
20
03
The wormhole hazard
S. Krasnikov∗
October 24, 2018
Abstract
To predict the outcome of (almost) any experiment we have to
assume that our spacetime is globally hyperbolic. The wormholes,
if they exist, cast doubt on the validity of this assumption. At the
same time, no evidence has been found so far (either observational,
or theoretical) that the possibility of their existence can be safely
neglected.
1 Introduction
According to a widespread belief general relativity is the science of gravita-
tional force. Which means, in fact, that it is important only in cosmology,
or in extremely subtle effects involving tiny post-Newtonian corrections.
However, this point of view is, perhaps, somewhat simplistic. Being con-
cerned with the structure of spacetime itself, relativity sometimes poses prob-
lems vital to whole physics. Two best known examples are singularities and
time machines. In this talk I discuss another, a little less known, but, in my
belief, equally important problem (closely related to the preceding two). In
a nutshell it can be formulated in the form of two question: What princi-
ple must be added to general relativity to provide it (and all other physics
along with it) by predictive power? Does not the (hypothetical) existence of
wormholes endanger that (hypothetical) principle?
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2 Global hyperbolicity and predictive power
2.1 Globally hyperbolic spacetimes
The globally hyperbolic spacetimes are the spacetimes with especially sim-
ple and benign causal structure, the spacetimes where we can use physical
theories in the same manner as is customary in the Minkowski space.
1. Definition. A spacetime M is globally hyperbolic if it contains a subset
S (called a Cauchy surface) which is met exactly once by every inextendible
causal curve in M .
2. Remark We shall not need the concept of a globally hyperbolic subset of
a spacetime, so below, whenever I call a subset U of M globally hyperbolic1,
I mean that U is globally hyperbolic, when considered as an (extendible)
spacetime by itself, not as a part of M .
Topologically globally hyperbolic spacetimes are ‘dull’ [1] in the following
sense.
3. Property. All Cauchy surfaces of a given globally hyperbolic spacetime
M are homeomorphic. Moreover,
M = S × IR1,
where S is a three-dimensional manifold, and S × {x} are Cauchy surfaces
of M for all x ∈ IR1.
The causal structure of globally hyperbolic spacetimes is also nice.
4. Property. Globally hyperbolic spacetimes do not contain closed causal
curves (for, if such a curve ℓ meets a set P once, then the causal curve ℓ ◦ ℓ
meets P twice).
5. Examples. The Minkowski and Friedmann spacetimes are both globally
hyperbolic. And a ‘conical’ spacetime
ds2 = −dt2 + dx2 + dr2 + r2dϕ2, r > 0, ϕ ∈ [0, ϕ0 < 2π),
which describes a cosmic string, is not. For, consider a ball B = {p : r(p) 6
π/2}. By definition a Cauchy surface must be achronal (i. e. no its points
can be connected by a timelike curve). But the t-coordinates of all points of
P ∩B, where P is achronal and passes through the origin of the coordinate
1A more rigorous term would be intrinsically globally hyperbolic [7].
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Figure 1: a. In the anti-de Sitter space some ‘unexpected’ (i. e. unknown
at P) information can come to p from infinity along the (timelike) dashed
curve. b. In the Schwarzschild spacetime everything, that reaches p, either
originates at S, or moves with a superluminal speed.
system, are bounded from above by some t0 > 0. So, the inextendible causal
curve
x = φ = 0, t = 2t0 + tan r
will never intersect P. Whence P is not a Cauchy surface.
Note that global hyperbolicity is not directly related to the absence of
singularities. For example, the (two-dimensional) anti-de Sitter spacetime,
which is a strip
ds2 = sec2 x (−dt2 + dx2), −π/2 < x < π/2
(see Fig. 1a), is non-globally hyperbolic, though it is singularity free (the
lines x = ±π/2 are infinities rather than singularities — it would take in-
finitely large time for an observer moving with a finite acceleration to reach
them). At the same time the Schwarzschild spacetime (see Fig. 1b) is globally
hyperbolic in spite of the singularities.
Let us call a system (i. e. a set of fields, and/or particles) predictable if
there is a spacelike surface such that the state of the system on that surface
uniquely determines its state at any future point. A theory is prognostic if all
systems described by that theory are predictable. A non-prognostic theory,
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i. e. a theory unable to predict the outcome of an experiment, is of doubtful
practical value.
The importance of globally hyperbolic spacetimes lies in the fact that all
usual relativistic theories (mechanics, electrodynamics, etc.) are prognostic
in such spacetimes. If the knowledge of everything that takes place at S is
insufficient for determining the state of the system at p, it means that the
necessary additional information either comes to p just out of nowhere (and
so the corresponding theory is indeterministic), or reaches p after propagating
along spacelike curves (only such curves can avoid meeting S). In the latter
case the theory admits superluminal signalling.
The reverse is also true: in a prognostic theory information does not
propagate faster than light. Indeed, take a point p′ slightly to the future
from p and consider the set I−(p′) of all points reachable from p′ by past-
directed timelike curves. It turns out that I−(p′) is globally hyperbolic, if
so is the whole spacetime (this is not obvious from Definition 1, but can
be easily established from another definition of global hyperbolicity [1], the
equivalence of which to ours is a highly non-trivial fact). Thus in a prognostic
theory a state of the system in p is uniquely determined by what takes place
in I−(p′) (in fact, even by those events that lie on its Cauchy surface). In
this sense no information from M − I−(p′) is available to an observer in p.
Our assertion then follows by continuity.
6. Example. Consider a field obeying the equation
(+ µ)φ = 0.
This is a second-order linear hyperbolic equation. The Cauchy problem for
such equations is known to be well-posed in any globally hyperbolic space-
time [1]. So, φ is predictable and hence, in particular, is unsuitable for
superluminal signaling (at least on the classical level). Which is noteworthy,
because, when µ > 0, such a field is traditionally referred to as ‘tachyonic’.
When a spacetime is globally hyperbolic and all material fields are pre-
dictable2, general relativity itself is also a prognostic theory: the metric of
a spacetime is uniquely determined by the Einstein equations, if it is known
on a Cauchy surface.
2Actually, for a rigorous proof a few additional mild assumptions are necessary, see
chapter 7 in Ref. [1].
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Figure 2: The banks of the cuts (which are depicted by the dashed lines) are
glued so that curve 2 is actually continuous and curve 3 — closed.
2.2 The general case
If the condition of global hyperbolicity is relaxed the situation with pre-
dictability is much worse. Let us illustrate it by a few simple examples.
Remove the points (t = ±1, x = ±1) from the Minkowski plane. Next,
make the cuts along the two spacelike segments {t = ±1, −1 < x < 1}
connecting them (see Fig. 2a). Now, preserving their orientation, glue the
banks of the cuts — the upper bank of the lower cut to the lower bank
of the upper cut and vice versa. The obtained spacetime M — called the
Deutsch–Politzer (DP) space — is a combination of a cylinder and a plane
with two holes (see Fig. 2b). The holes result from excising the ‘corner’
points (we cannot glue them back into the spacetime) and form singularities
of a somewhat unusual kind3: the spacetime is flat and thus the singularities
are not associated with the divergence of curvature, or its derivatives. In
addition to singularities the spacetime contains closed causal curves, which
makes it one of the simplest models of the time machine [2, 3]. These are
the images of the causal curves which in the original (Minkowski) space start
from the lower segment and terminate at the upper.
7. Remark. We described the DP space as a result of some ‘cut-and-
3In many respects they resemble the conical singularity from Example 1.
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paste’ procedure. This, however, gives no grounds at all to consider it as
something defective and unphysical. In fact, it is exactly as ‘physical’ as the
Minkowski space, being the solution of the Einstein equations with exactly
the same (zero) source and exactly the same initial conditions (see below).
If desired, one could start from the Deutsch–Politzer spacetime and obtain
the Minkowski space by a similar surgery.
The whole spacetime M is not globally hyperbolic (by property 4). How-
ever, all its ‘pathologies’, i. e. singularities and time loops, are confined to a
region P (in Fig. 2a it is shown gray) bounded by null geodesics emerging
from the lower ‘holes’. The remaining part N ≡M−P ofM is a ‘nice’ space-
time. Specifically, N , considered as a spacetime (see remark 2), is globally
hyperbolic, the line SN = {p : t(p) = −2} being one of its Cauchy surfaces.
We have thus a spacetime that ‘looses’ its global hyperbolicity in the course
of evolution. This lost, as can be easily seen, is fatal for the predictability of
material systems.
8. Example. Suppose our subject matter are pointlike sterile particles,
which is, probably, the simplest possible subject. Let us fix the simplest
possible initial data — no particles at all at SN . It is easy to check that
neither these initial data, nor the equations of motion4 give us any clue
about what will happen later. Possibly the spacetime will always remain
empty. But exactly as well later there may appear some particles. Such ‘new’
particles (‘lions’ in terminology of [4]) may have the world lines emerging from
a singularity (as with particle 4), or rolled into a circle (particle 3).
Moreover, it may happen that quite an innocent Cauchy problem in a
non-globally hyperbolic spacetime does not have any solution whatsoever.
This fact is known as the ‘time travel paradox’ [4].
9. Example. Consider a spacetime which is constructed exactly as the
Deutsch–Politzer space, except that before gluing the cuts, one of them is
twisted by 180◦ (see Fig. 3a). Such a spacetime — called the twisted DP
space — is especially convenient for constructing paradoxes, because the
world lines even of free falling particles have self-intersections. Our concern
is with the behaviour of massless particles whose dynamics is determined by
the following rules. Each particle is characterized by two integer parameters
— we shall call them ‘color’ and ‘flavor’ — that take three and two values,
respectively. The particles are assumed to be sterile with a single exception:
if two identical (i. e. with the same values of both parameters) particles meet,
4Nor, of course, any their consequences, like the energy conservation.
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Figure 3: a. The twisted Deutsch–Politzer space. The banks of the horizontal
cuts are glued so that both curves (1 and 2) are smooth. b. The time travel
paradox. The trajectories of all possible (given there are only 3 particles at
SN) particles are shown. The world lines of the ‘initial’ particles cannot be
continued in agreement with the laws of interaction.
they both change their flavor. Suppose now that at some moment t < −1
there are three particles of different colors, all moving to the left, as shown
in Fig. 3b. If the spacetime remained globally hyperbolic at later times,
these initial conditions would just determine the evolution of the particles,
but not in this case. In the twisted DP space no evolution (governed by the
formulated laws of interaction) is consistent with the initial data [4].
The situation with the evolution of the spacetime geometry is also bad
in the general case. Note, for example, that any sufficiently small region of
the DP space — including the vicinity of SN — is isometric to the corre-
sponding region of the Minkowski space. Which means, in particular, that if
the Minkowski space is a solution of some Cauchy problem (i. e. of a system
{some local — Einstein’s, say — equations + conditions on SN}), then the
DP space is also a solution of the same Cauchy problem. And this is always
the case: whenever a Cauchy problem in general relativity has a globally
hyperbolic solution M , it also has infinitely many non-globally hyperbolic
solutions (remove from M a two-sphere S lying to the future from S; the
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double covering of M − S is an example of such ‘spurious’ solution). Within
classical relativity (complemented, if desired, with any additional local laws)
all these solutions are equipollent.
3 Cosmic censorship hypothesis
Summing up the preceding we can state that physics is a nice (prognostic)
theory if it is known somehow that our spacetime is globally hyperbolic.
Otherwise, not so much can be said about anything whatsoever. Strictly
speaking, in the general case we cannot give a substantiated answer even to
the question: Where a car, moving at 60 km per hour, will find itself in 20
minutes? The honest answer would be: If the car is lucky enough it will
pass 20 km, but exactly as well it may happen that (after 10 minutes, say)
a singularity will appear out of thin air (as in the DP case) and the car will
vanish in it, or will be attacked by a monster that will have emerged from
the singularity, etc. All such possibilities are in perfect agreement with both
the initial data and the known physical laws.
In everyday life people cope with this difficulty by assuming (implicitly
as a rule) that the spacetime, indeed, is globally hyperbolic. So, it seems
tempting to solve the whole problem by just explicitly adopting global hy-
perbolicity as an additional postulate. The spacetimes of the DP type would
then be ruled out and general relativity would consider only globally hyper-
bolic maximal solutions of the Einstein equations as appropriate models of
the universe.
Such a program, however, immediately meets two problems. The first is
of the philosophical nature: it is hard to justify such a non-local postulate
(indeed, as we saw in example 9, our ability to perform some experiments
now may depend on whether or not a causal loop will appear somewhere
in the future). The second problem is more serious: this new postulate can
come into contradiction with the ‘old’ ones. Spacetimes are conceivable (see
below) where the lost of global hyperbolicity is an inevitable consequence
of the Einstein equations (for specific initial conditions, of course, and with
maximality required). So, the best one can hope is that such situations are
impossible in ‘realistic’ circumstances. And it is this hope — known as the
Cosmic censorship hypothesis — that is endangered by the wormholes.5
5If one discovered how to create a timelike singularity, it also would violate the Cosmic
censorship hypothesis. This possibility, however, is much better known (see, for example,
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Figure 4: When the identification is performed, the dashed lines become
circles. Note that as time goes these lines get more and more tilted. Finally,
one of them (the one lying on the boundary of the gray cone) becomes null
and the first closed causal curve appears.
4 Wormholes
Pick in the Minkowski space two close cylinders C1 and C2, of which the
second has a bend between, say, t = −1 and t = 1. Except for that bend
both cylinders must be parallel to the t-axis (see Fig. 4a). On the boundaries
of the cylinders B1,2 ≡ BdC1,2 define a function τ as follows: τ(p) is the length
of the longest (recall that the metric is Lorentzian) timelike curve that lies
in B1,2 and connects p with the surface t = −2. Clearly, τ(p) = t(p) for all
p ∈ B1, but not for p ∈ B2. Now remove the interiors of the cylinders and
identify the boundaries B1 and B2 so that
p1 = p2 ⇒ τ(p1) = τ(p2), p1,2 ∈ B1,2. (∗)
Finally, smooth out the junction by curving appropriately a close vicinity of
B1 = B2 (to remove the discontinuities in derivatives of the metric).
To see what thus obtained spacetime MW presents, consider its section
SN = {p : t(p) = −2}. According to the procedure described above, SN is
obtained from the Euclidean space E3 by removing two open balls, identifying
the boundaries of the holes, and smoothing out the junction. So, SN is a
in [5]) and I shall not discuss it here
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wormhole (in the two-dimensional case, see Fig. 4b, we would call it a handle).
The former holes are called mouths and the ‘conduit’ connecting them the
throat. The form of the throat depends on just how we have smoothed
out the junction, but — and this is important — it can be made (almost)
constant (that is what the condition (∗) was imposed for). So, MW describes
a wormhole one of whose mouths is somehow pushed away from the other
(without changing the length and the form of the throat) and then returned
back [6].
This spacetime, proposed by Morris, Thorne, and Yurtsever (MTY) [6],
received much attention, because at one time it was believed to describe
the creation of a time machine. Indeed, the identified points of B1 and B2
initially (i. e. at t = −2) have the same t-coordinate, but later, according to
(∗), each p1 ∈ B1 is identified with a p2 ∈ B2 such that t(p2) > t(p1). As soon
as t(p2)− t(p1) becomes greater than x(p2)−x(p1) the identified points turn
out to be causally connected in the ‘initial’ (i. e. Minkowski) space. Which
means that MW contains closed causal curves.
As with the DP space, the causal loops are confined to a region Q (the
gray cone in Fig. 4a) that lies to the future of a globally hyperbolic (when
considered in itself) spacetime L ≡MW −Q. So, we again have a spacetime
loosing its global hyperbolicity in the course of evolution. However, there is
also a striking difference with the previous case. The additional postulate
— to the effect that the whole (i. e. maximal) spacetime must be globally
hyperbolic — only required that N would evolve into the Minkowski (and not
Deutsch–Politzer, say) space, something that intuitively is quite acceptable
and even appealing. But L does not have globally hyperbolic extensions and
therefore makes us choose between maximality and global hyperbolicity.
Thus the wormholes (if they exist, if they are stable, if their mouths can be
separately moved, etc.) refute the Cosmic censorship hypothesis. Just take
a wormhole, push one of its mouths, and pull it back. Whatever results6, it
will be in any case non-globally hyperbolic.
5 Global hyperbolicity protection
How serious is the wormhole hazard and do wormholes exist in nature, in the
first place? The wormholes are often considered as ‘a marginal idea’ [8], as
6As has been proved recently, it need not be a time machine: among the possible
extensions of L there always are causal ones [7].
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something ‘too exotic’, that is, essentially, as something that unlikely exists.
The reasons for such a belief are not always clear, but, at any rate, they are
neither experimental, nor theoretical.
The idea at the heart of general relativity is that the spacetime we live
in is a curved four-dimensional manifold. Which immediately provokes a
question: What is it so special in IR4, that one would believe it to be the
only possible topology of the universe? The answer (as of today, at least) is
obvious — nothing. One hardly would be surprised, for example, if it turn
out that we live in a spatially closed universe.
The argument: “We haven’t ever seen any wormholes, so they don’t exist”
does not, of course, stand up. The wormholes do not shine like stars and are
not supposed to be ‘seen’. The presence of a wormhole surely would strongly
affect the surrounding matter, but to what observable effects it must lead,
is yet to be learned. Some progress in this direction has been achieved by
Cramer et al. [9], who noticed that the gravitational lensing of wormholes may
differ from that of stars. By Birkhoff’s theorem the gravitational field of a
static spherically symmetric wormhole (in the empty region around it) is that
of a pointlike massive source. The valuem of the corresponding mass depends
on what wormhole is considered and at present there are no reasons to regard
any m as ‘more realistic’. It is important, however, that in particular m may
be negative. Such wormholes would act more like diverging lenses in contrast
to the stars with their positive masses. These considerations enabled Torres
et al. [10] to find some (though not too restrictive) bounds on the possible
abundance of wormholes with negative m.
In a globally hyperbolic spacetime only primordial wormholes may exist
(see property 3). So, the most direct way to support the Cosmic censorship
hypothesis would be to find a mechanism excluding their existence at the
onset of classical physics (i. e. at the end of the Planck era). Needless to say
that no such mechanism is known yet.
Another way out would be to prove that realistic wormholes cannot be
traversable [11], i. e. large and long-lived enough to pass a macroscopic object
through the throat7. Indeed, the Einstein equations ensure [12] that to be
traversable a wormhole must be maintained by the ‘exotic matter’ (i. e. the
matter whose energy density is negative in some points). Which means, in
7A standard example of a non-traversable wormhole is the Schwarzschild solution. Even
though there are two asymptotically flat regions (I and II in Fig. 1b) connected with a
‘bridge’, a traveler cannot get from one of them to the other because the bridge collapses
too fast.
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fact, that at the classical level the traversable wormholes are prohibited (ex-
cept for a few rather exotic possibilities such as the classical scalar field [13],
or ghost radiation [14] as a source). So, if it turns out that quantum ef-
fects (which are known to produce negative energy densities as, for example,
in the Casimir effect [15]) also fail to support macroscopic wormholes, the
problem would be solved. Actually, however, the quantum fields seem to be
well suited for the task. In particular, a wormhole was found such that the
zero point fluctuations of the electro-magnetic or neutrino fields in its throat
produce just enough exotic matter to sustain the wormhole [16].
Lastly, it may happen that traversable wormholes do exist, but, neverthe-
less, the MTY scenario does not work because the mouths cannot be moved
appropriately. The point is that in the spacetimes of that type there always
exist ‘almost closed’ null geodesics. In Fig. 4a such a geodesic goes from
the left mouth, enters the right one, comes again from the left, etc. Though
always remaining in L, a photon with this world line makes infinitely many
trips between the mouths getting more and more blue [17]. This may in-
dicate that the process is unstable in the sense that an occasional photon
can prevent one from bringing the mouths close enough — the closer are
the mouths the stronger is the resistance offered by the photon. Of course,
classically such an instability can be cancelled by just placing an opaque
screen between the mouths, but one does not expect the quantum modes to
be counteracted as easily. Which suggests that the MTY process may suffer
quantum instability. To verify this hypothesis it is instructive to study the
behavior of the vacuum expectation of the stress-energy tensor near BdL
and to check whether or not it is bounded [18]. This has been done in a few
simplest (two-dimensional) cases and no evidence for the quantum instability
was found — exactly as with the Minkowski space the energy density in some
cases blows up [19] and in other cases [20, 21] does not.
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